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COMMENT
CHINA’S MOONSHOT: HOW THE INTRODUCTION OF
THE DIGITAL RENMINBI FURTHERS CHINA’S
SOCIETAL GRIP AND THREATENS THE FUTURE OF
DIGITAL CURRENCIES
B RANDON M ICKELSEN *
I. INTRODUCTION
China’s introduction of the digital renminbi puts the country on the
fast track to become the first G-20 nation to adopt a full-fledged digital
currency. The use of the digital renminbi provides both domestic and
international benefits to the growing power. Domestically, the digital
renminbi enables China to track economic trends in real-time, curtail illegal
payments, and provide relief to its vast unbanked population. Internationally,
China’s digital renminbi enables near-instantaneous settlement among tradepartners, reduces transaction costs, and most importantly, provides its users
the ability to circumvent internationally imposed sanctions.
Nonetheless, the digital renminbi’s benefits mask its place in China’s
surveillance state. The currency’s direct ties to China’s central government
enables tracking of all payments down to an individual user, fitting directly
into a regime that increasingly uses reeducation camps, facial recognition,
and other means of widespread monitoring to control the movement and
thoughts of its citizens. The digital renminbi’s ability to suppress civil rights
should strike fear if the currency proliferates worldwide. Though its benefits
are numerous, the currency’s place in China’s surveillance state should give
pause to worldwide adoption of the digital renminbi or its framework.
This paper does not recommend specific responses to the
introduction of the digital renminbi. Instead, it seeks to lend insight on the
benefits and drawbacks of China’s approach. In particular, the paper will
discuss how a digital renminbi helps fulfill China’s domestic ambitions, and
highlights the digital renminbi’s role in international trade, including its
*Brandon Mickelsen is a 2022 J.D. candidate at the University of St. Thomas
School of Law. A special thanks to Robert Delahunty for his continued support
throughout the writing process.
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presence in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Finally, the paper will analyze
the human rights implications of introducing a digital currency into China’s
surveillance state. One thing is certain, the digital renminbi’s introduction
marks the beginning of a sea of digital currency initiatives. It remains to be
seen whether countries adopt China’s approach or chart their own path.
Regardless, the world’s response will have massive implications on trade and
human rights.

II. CHINA’S DIGITAL CURRENCY
In 2014, China announced an ambitious, and potentially worldaltering, goal: releasing a digital version of its currency.1 The soon-to-becalled digital renminbi gained priority among China’s top policymakers
when it was officially written into China’s 13th Five Year Plan in 2016,
placing the currency at the forefront of China’s social and economic
initiatives.2 After five years of research and development, China used 2020
to parade its progress, launching the digital renminbi’s initial pilot program.
While small, the pilot showcased the effectiveness and efficiency of the
digital currency’s infrastructure.
The digital renminbi provides vast benefits to an increasingly digital
Chinese society. A digital currency enhances the People’s Bank of China’s
(PBOC) monetary and fiscal abilities, enabling the country to distribute
stimulus funds to even the most remote of locations, stymie sudden inflation
or deflation, and stop fraud, embezzlement, or terroristic activities in their
tracks. Further, a digital renminbi introduced on an international stage can
buoy China’s vast international infrastructure projects. However, the digital
currency also holds a dark place in China’s surveillance state. It sacrifices
civil rights to fill yet another piece in China’s surveillance puzzle— allowing
the country to monitor and control the daily activities of all its citizens.
China will aim to flaunt the benefits of its digital currency. As the
first major power to implement a digital currency, the digital renminbi’s
potential success will give China the power to dictate the creation of an
international framework for developing digital currencies. International
organizations, however, must proceed with caution. The positive attributes
of the digital renminbi, namely the ability to ease transactions, reduce
1

Yuan Yang & Hudson Lockett, What is China’s Digital Currency Plan?, FIN.
TIMES (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/e3f9c3c2-0aaf-11ea-bb5234c8d9dc6d84.
2
David Pan, Zhou Xiaochuan: The Father of the Digital Yuan, COINDESK (Dec.
9, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/zhou-xiaochuan-most-influential-2020.
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transactional costs, and reach the unbanked, should be studied and
implemented by other countries. However, countries must also address the
human rights implications of a digital currency. Any worldwide standard
must protect individuals’ privacy rights. China’s approach sets aside privacy,
but democratic governments must ensure it becomes a priority for its own
digital currency implementation. The digital renminbi provides a worthwhile
template for a digital currency implementation, but countries must proceed
with caution if using the approach for their own digital currency adoption
framework.

A. How China’s Digital Renminbi Works
Before diving into the benefits of China’s digital renminbi, this paper
will provide a general description of how the currency works, both from a
technological and an economic perspective. The digital renminbi is hypercentralized, controlled solely by the PBOC.3 The digital renminbi’s structure
is two-tiered. The first tier consists of the PBOC issuing funds to state-owned
banks and payment firms such as Alipay and WeChat. From there, banks and
firms distribute the funds to individual accounts on mobile apps.4 All
exchanges utilizing the digital renminbi are recorded on a ledger directly
controlled by the PBOC, providing the bank oversight over any transaction.5
China’s implementation of two digital renminbi pilots provides a
glimpse of how the currency will function in Chinese society. The initial
digital renminbi pilot included four large cities: Shenzhen, Suzhou, Chengdu,
and Xiong’an.6 In lieu of the payroll deposits, workers received funds
through a state-developed app on their cell phone. From there, designated
merchants accepted digital renminbi payment via the state-developed app.7
A second pilot program concluded in December 2020. The PBOC
held a lottery for citizens in Suzhou, randomly choosing 100,000 citizens to

3

Aditi Kumar & Eric Rosenbach, Could China’s Digital Currency Unseat the
Dollar?, FOREIGN AFF. (May 20, 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ch
ina/2020-05-20/could-chinas-digital-currency-unseat-dollar.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Jonathan Cheng, China Rolls Out Pilot Test of Digital Currency, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-rolls-out-pilot-test-of-digitalcurrency-11587385339.
7
Id.
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receive two hundred renminbi for online or offline purchases.8 The second
pilot involved a more extensive inclusion of merchants, including delivery
services, and tested a broader range of uses throughout the city.9 A timeline
for a full-phased rollout has yet to be announced;10 but the pilot programs,
though small in scale, proved to be largely successful and show the massive
potential that a digital renminbi holds domestically and abroad.
The pilot programs provide a glimpse of the currency’s usage in
everyday life. For in-store purchases, users of the digital renminbi generate a
QR code which the receiving merchant then scans.11 A user does not need to
be online for these transactions to occur—a tap together of two offlinecapable devices is sufficient to complete a transaction.12
The initial use of the digital renminbi has no measurable impact on
currency circulation and domestic economic policies. Because the digital
renminbi merely replaces the physical version, renminbi circulation will not
directly increase or decrease.13 In the long term, however, its impact could
be tremendous. Having oversight over spending—in real-time—allows the
PBOC to track trends and react as necessary, giving China the ability to enact
a near-instantaneous monetary policy. If spending dips, the PBOC could
implement negative interest rates that drive spending increases across the
board. Further, the PBOC would have direct control over financing
endeavors, requiring the review of interest rates, loan terms, and other
essential details before any loans can be distributed.14
The introduction of a digital renminbi provides comprehensive
domestic benefits. From a complete transition to digital payments, to
enhanced visibility over domestic spending, the digital renminbi will create
a new set of monetary options for the PBOC. These options are not readily
8

Jonathan Cheng, China Envisions Its Digital-Currency Future, With Lotteries
and a Year’s Worth of Laundry, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2020), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/china-envisions-its-digital-currency-future-with-lotteries-and-a-yearsworth-of-laundry-11609066819.
9
Id.
10
There is speculation that a broad rollout could be timed with the 2022 Winter
Olympics taking place in Beijing. This could allow the Chinese government to show
its digital currency to a global audience and highlight the country’s economic and
technological prowess.
11
Cheng, supra note 6.
12
Id.
13
How China Is Closing in on Its Own Digital Currency, BLOOMBERG (Sep. 8,
2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-08/how-china-isclosing-in-on-its-own-digital-currency-quicktake.
14
Id.
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available in a purely cash-driven state. Introducing the digital renminbi to
international trade provides additional benefits, including increased usage of
China’s Cross-border Interbank Payments System (CIPS).

B. Transacting Over CIPS
Today’s global financial framework evolved from the 1944 Bretton
Woods Conference. The three-week conference, held among forty-four
nations, established the U.S. dominated global financial system—a system
that holds strong to this day.15 Despite the Bretton Woods system effectively
ending in 1976 when the U.S. dollar separated from the gold standard, the
system’s structure remains in place. The U.S. dollar remains the most coveted
reserve currency, making up nearly 60 percent of all foreign central bank
reserves.16 The dollar’s prevalence ensures that most international
transactions are cleared in U.S. dollars and through U.S. banks.
The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
(SWIFT) facilitates most dollar transactions upon a vast, far-reaching
financial messaging system. SWIFT aims to ease the complexities of global
banking by providing its nearly 11,000 members unique IDs, a borderless
messaging system, and a common transaction language.17 Its transaction
volume is massive, conducting over 30 million per day, with 40 percent of
transactions using the U.S. dollar.18
The complexities and sheer volume of transactions, however, make
the SWIFT network both slow and costly. The system runs multiple criminal
checks to mitigate illegal transactions across the network, creating

15

Greg Rosalky, 75 Years Ago the U.S. Dollar Became The World's Currency.
Will That Last?, NPR (Jul. 30, 2019), https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2019/07
/30/746337868/75-years-ago-the-u-s-dollar-became-the-worlds-currency-will-thatlast.
16
Robert Hackett, China’s Drive for Digital Currency Dominance, FORTUNE
75, 79 (Aug./Sep. 2020).
17
The Financial World’s Nervous System is Being Rewired, ECONOMIST
(May 9, 2020), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020/05/07/thefinancial-worlds-nervous-system-is-being-rewired.
18
Mary Hui, The World’s Money Transfer System is China’s Achilles Heel in
Its Sanctions Battle Against the U.S., QUARTZ (Aug. 18, 2020), https://qz.com/1893
235/swift-transfer-system-leaves-china-vulnerable-to-us-sanctions;
Kazuhiro Kida et al., Rise of the Yuan: China-based Payment Settlements Jump
80%, NIKKEI ASIA (May 20, 2019), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Markets/Riseof-the-yuan-China-based-payment-settlements-jump-80.
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redundancies that add cost and time.19 Even more worrisome, the system is
vulnerable to hacking. In 2016, North Korean hackers stole $101 million by
manipulating SWIFT’s transfer instructions.20 And since 2015, a North
Korean connected hacker group has attempted to steal more than $2 billion
across the global economic network.21 While SWIFT remains the
predominant transaction network, its vulnerabilities and costs leave openings
for other promising alternatives.
SWIFT’s deficiencies are not solely attributable to system issues.
Growing outside influence over the messaging system drives concerns over
the independence of the private network. Specifically, calls to lessen western
countries’ influence over SWIFT have increased as sanction pressure begins
to mount.
The prevalence of the U.S. dollar is one of the driving factors of
sanctions. The U.S. wields its legal interest in dollar transactions to impose
sanctions upon individuals, corporations, and countries.22 In the past, the U.S.
effectively utilized country-wide sanctions and subsequent SWIFT-imposed
disconnections. For example, the U.S. and European Union implemented
sanctions to inflict punishment against Iran for running a nuclear weapons
program,23 crippling the Iranian economy.24 More recently, the Trump
administration used sanctions to prevent Chinese companies from purchasing
U.S. semiconductor technology.25
A dollar-centric global economy, primarily transacted with the
assistance of SWIFT, gives the U.S. vast opportunities to utilize economic
19

Despite being headquartered in Belgium, the U.S. holds vast powers over
SWIFT, largely because of the overwhelming number of transactions involving the
U.S. dollar.
20
How to Launder Ill-gotten Gains, ECONOMIST (Sep. 10, 2020),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2020/09/10/how-to-launderill-gotten-gains.
21
Id.
22
America’s Aggressive Use of Sanctions Endangers the Dollar’s Reign,
ECONOMIST (Jan. 18, 2020), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2020/01/18/amer
icas-aggressive-use-of-sanctions-endangers-the-dollars-reign. (As of 2018, America
has over 30 active financial and trade sanction programs)
23
Brian O’Toole, Don’t Believe the SWIFT China Sanctions Hype, ATLANTIC
COUNCIL (Sep. 15, 2020), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/newatlanticist/dont-believe-the-swift-china-sanctions-hype.
24
Six Charts that Show How Hard U.S. Sanctions Have Hit Iran, BBC (Dec. 9,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48119109.
25
Joe McDonald, Huawei: Smartphone Chips Running Out Under U.S.
Sanctions, AP NEWS (Aug. 8, 2020), https://apnews.com/270e93e985733a4d086c0
6a01375cea0.
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sanctions to dictate foreign policy. Though SWIFT is independent, the U.S.
has threatened to sanction the organization if it does not disconnect a country
from the global messaging network.26 As pressures mount, and the
independence of SWIFT comes into question, countries fearful of
disconnections from global commerce continue to search for alternatives.
China, recognizing the flaws of SWIFT and the growing western
influence over the network, introduced CIPS to facilitate the clearing of the
renminbi in international transactions. Compared to SWIFT, CIPS
transaction volume is minuscule.27 CIPS member size is also considerably
smaller, consisting of 1,023 participants across ninety-six countries.28
Despite its smaller size, CIPS provides China a considerable
advantage for clearing renminbi-based transactions. Transactions related to
China’s vast international development venture, the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI), increasingly use China’s renminbi versus the U.S. dollar or other
currencies. CIPS provides an English-language-based system that provides
real-time settlement versus the slower, more cumbersome, SWIFT system.29
And more importantly for certain countries, CIPS provides an alternative
settlement system that can help avoid U.S. or internationally imposed
sanctions.
If bank-specific, or more broadly, country-specific, disconnections
are made by the SWIFT network, it can have dramatic ramifications on
domestic markets. China’s current usage of CIPS focuses on providing
facilitating settlement and clearing cross-border transactions using the
renminbi rather than providing an alternative messaging service to SWIFT.30
CIPS initial implementation uses SWIFT as the primary messaging system.31
But China could sever CIPS usage of SWIFT and instead implement
its own alternative messaging system.32 And if China finds the need to
26

What SWIFT is and Why It Matters in the U.S.-Iran Spat, AL JAZEERA (Nov.
5, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2018/11/5/what-swift-is-and-why-itmatters-in-the-us-iran-spat.
27
CIPS transacts the equivalent of $19.4 billion per day, compared to $5-6
trillion transacted over SWIFT. Hung Tran, Can China’s Digital Yuan Really
Challenge the Dollar?, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.atlanticc
ouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/can-chinas-digital-yuan-really-challenge-thedollar/.
28
Meanwhile, SWIFT has over 11,000 members. Id.
29
Kida et al., supra note 18.
30
ESWAR PRASAD, GAINING CURRENCY: THE RISE OF THE RENMINBI 114
(2016).
31
Id.
32
Id.
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provide a legitimate alternative to western financial clearinghouses and
messaging systems, it potentially would. Providing transactions over CIPS
allows China to continue to trade with countries facing broad sanctions from
multiple international bodies. Russia, Turkey, and various African countries
affected by western-imposed sanctions transitioned over to CIPS, providing
them an alternative in case sanctions impact their ability to transact with other
clearing systems.33
Once expanded beyond its initial domestic use, China’s digital
renminbi could transact primarily, if not entirely, over CIPS. The speed and
efficiency of CIPS, coupled with the near-instantaneous transaction ability of
the digital renminbi, will provide a significant trade advantage over dollarbased SWIFT transactions. Clearing of international trade, usually taking
days, could be completed in almost real-time. Further, trade disruptions
caused by internationally imposed sanctions could be avoided, providing
China and BRI countries the economic stability that often eludes them today.

C. China’s Rationales for Digital Currency Implementation
Despite the digital renminbi’s placement in China’s Five-Year Plan,
the country’s initial introduction of the currency provided limited details on
how it benefits China’s ever-growing society. Recognizing the lack of detail,
and preparing for the currency’s wider rollout, the Chinese government
increased its efforts to show the value of the digital renminbi, highlighting
five main points in explaining the rationale for its quick implementation:
1. Enabling the People’s Bank of China to have greater
control over the financial sector and monetary system;
2. Reducing the threat posed by other cryptocurrencies,
including Bitcoin and Libra;
3. Providing additional support to the existing, and widely
used, mobile payment infrastructure;
4. Promoting financial inclusion by making payments
accessible to citizens without bank accounts; and
5. Protecting against money laundering, fraud, and terrorism
financing.34

33

Kida et al., supra note 18.
Hu Yue et al., In Depth: China's Digital Currency Ambitions Lead the World,
NIKKEI ASIA (Dec. 3, 2020), https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Caixin/In-depthChina-s-digital-currency-ambitions-lead-the-world.
34
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Each of these rationales will be discussed in detail below, providing
a background and wide lens view of the current issues, followed by how the
digital renminbi addresses the perceived issues.

1. China’s First Rationale: Enabling Greater
Financial and Monetary Control
As China navigates through the COVID-19 pandemic, President Xi
Jinping intends to undertake a substantial shift in the country’s economic
policy. Under previous presidents, China made moves toward a more open
capital market, encouraging foreign investment, and loosening various
economic controls as the years progressed. Recent actions, however, show a
countrywide redirect to ensure that foreign investment and domestic
companies’ actions do not conflict with party goals. Background to China’s
open market shift and evidence of this trend ending is discussed below.
Following that discussion, the digital renminbi’s place in ensuring adherence
to party ideas and the new vision of China’s economy will be analyzed.
In practice, most advanced economies have open markets. An open,
free-market economy, that allows an unrestricted flow of capital both in and
out of the country, provides many benefits. These benefits include the
entrance of foreign investors into the market, bringing with them increased
trading volumes and overall performance improvements based on a demand
for more governance and transparency.35 China, in contrast, practices a
controlled open-market approach, allowing foreign investment while still
maintaining a guiding hand over the marketplace. Two primary factors drive
China’s market control: the increased oversight of foreign investors, and a
wariness to lower the massive savings rate throughout the country.
Increasing foreign investors in a market, while beneficial, brings
enhanced enforcement of operating policies and transparency.36 Though
investors favor transparency, increased oversight exposes corporations that
may be using less-than-ethical tactics to drive success. A growing domestic
market and an influx of foreign investors looking to take advantage of cheap,
excess labor drove China’s booming growth. However, the influx of
investment also brought strict requirements of technology transfer, some of
which China has been accused of stealing versus legally acquiring.37 An open
35

PRASAD, supra note 30, at 45.
Id.
37
Keith Bradsher, How China Obtains American Trade Secrets, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/15/business/china-technologytransfer.html.
36
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market brings strict requirements of transparency, which could have massive
implications to the economy depending on the legitimacy of China’s
corporations’ tactics.
China is also wary of a massive outflow of capital.38 Historically,
China’s savings rates are significantly higher than other countries: 46 percent
of GDP compared to a worldwide average of 20 percent.39 Multiple factors
drive household savings in China, including the countries one-child policy,
its implementation of economic reform in the 1990s that reduced both job
security and state benefits, and the country’s growing income inequality.40
The PBOC favors a savings-oriented society. Savings drive large
amounts of money towards state-owned banks, giving them access to cheap
lending funds. China recognizes the benefits of cheap funds and, as a result,
places many restrictions on the ability of households to invest outside the
country.41 While outward foreign direct investment by corporations increased
over the last decade, individual households do not have this opportunity to
diversify their savings.
Despite China’s concerns over foreign investors and capital outflow,
the PBOC made efforts to open its markets significantly. In 2007, the PBOC
invited foreign banks to take equity stakes in state-owned banks with the
hopes of driving corporate governance reforms throughout the industry.42
China gradually opened both inflows and outflows in other markets, as well.
Since 2008, China drastically reduced its quotas on foreign investment in the
Chinese stock market along with the country’s government and corporate
bond market, bringing more foreign countries and corporations into the
marketplace.43
These openings showcased China altering its approach to its
controlled open market. China’s selective approach intended to increase
international exposure and demand for the renminbi while also preventing
some of the adverse effects China associates with a completely open
marketplace.44 This idea of “managed market convertibility,” leading to a
more open China, seemed to be the direction the People’s Republic of China
38

PRASAD, supra note 30, at 45.
Longmei Zhang et al., China’s High Savings: Drivers, Prospects, and Policies
5 (IMF, Working Paper No. 18/277, 2018).
40
Id. at 10-11.
41
PRASAD, supra note 30, at 44.
42
Id. at 46.
43
Id. at 50-51.
44
Id. at 69.
39
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(PRC) would take moving forward. Recently, however, President Xi Jinping
indicated a different path for the country.
Despite China’s forty years of enormous economic growth—a trend
arguably attributable to the country’s efforts to open its markets—President
Xi Jinping intends to reorient the market to the party’s needs. In a redirect
from the previous free-market direction, President Xi continues to enact
extensive control over domestic companies, guiding them to “the modern
enterprise system with Chinese characteristics.”45 The size and scope of this
control could be enormous. No company, no matter how successful, will be
out of reach. Even Chinese global success stories, such as Ant Group Co.,
Ltd. are not immune to the President’s control.46
China’s new approach of a “dual circulation” strategy emphasizes a
redirect towards domestic sustainability and stability.47 “Internal circulation”
aligns directly with China’s 2025 plan to focus on growing domestic
strengths.48 In five years, China plans to be technologically self-reliant,
shedding its exposure to U.S. sanctions and gaining back the upper hand over
its internal affairs.49 President Xi does not hide his desire to showcase the
ever-increasing state hand in affairs. From financial aid for high-tech
industries, to a shift of bank loans to state-owned enterprises, the state’s
influence in China’s market continues to grow.50
However, “internal circulation” does not mean a shift to closing off
China’s external markets. The country will continue to lure in foreign
companies to strengthen its supply chain and deter other countries from
45

Michael Schuman, The Undoing of China’s Economic Miracle, ATLANTIC
(Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/01/xijinping-china-economy-jack-ma/617552.
46
Jing Yang, Jack Ma’s Ant Plans Major Revamp in Response to Chinese
Pressure, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/jack-mas-antplans-major-revamp-in-response-to-chinese-pressure-11611749842.
47
Schuman, supra note 45.
48
Kevin Yao, What We Know About China's 'Dual Circulation' Economic
Strategy, REUTERS (Sep. 15, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/chinaeconomy-transformation-explainer/what-we-know-about-chinas-dual-circulationeconomic-strategy-idUSKBN2600B5.
49
Lingling Wei, China Stresses Reliance on Its Own Technologies in Five-Year
Plan, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2020) https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-leadershipsays-economy-will-reachmid-level-within-15-years-11603969958.
50
Schuman, supra note 45; See also, Liza Lin, China Targets Alibaba, Other
Homegrown Tech Giants with Antimonopoly Rules, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-regulators-prepare-to-roll-out-newantimonopoly-rules-11605013205 (China has increased its anti-monopoly efforts to
curb private enterprise power in the Chinese marketplace).
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shifting away from China.51 But strengthening China’s domestic abilities will
soften, if not eliminate, the effect of sanctions or other laws seeking to limit
China’s broad reach. The development of a digital renminbi will only help
this state-wide change.
The digital renminbi’s programmability and oversight capabilities
provide China with massive control over its domestic markets and
corporations. As China seeks to reorient market and corporate actions to
ensure they align with party desires, a digital renminbi provides yet another
lever the state can pull to ensure compliance. First, the digital renminbi’s
ledger technology provides traceability of corporate spending and foreign
investment. If state-owned (or even private) enterprises are distributing funds
or resources to initiatives that do not align with party needs, China can
impose fines, penalties, or take control of these enterprises.
President Xi aims to track all these activities through a newly
developed “Corporate Social Credit” system.52 As advertised, the system
would detect corporations evading taxes or violating other corporate laws.
But the system’s usage could become even broader in practice, providing the
government another tool “to intrude on private managers.”53 This new system
furthers President Xi’s self-sufficiency goals, and the digital renminbi plays
a vital role in achieving the lofty endeavor.
The digital currency’s programmability provides the PBOC
extensive oversight capabilities. Programmability allows banks to provide
conditions on loans. Instead of distributing funds and losing the ability to
trace spending, banks could impose a system of checks, ensuring that money
can only be used for one particular purpose or project. The same goes for
foreign investment. China can gain an even greater grasp of international
investment by using the digital renminbi to allow investments in particular
corporations or markets, albeit with specific programmable terms.
As China imposes stricter monopoly controls and encourages
domestic spending, a programmable currency increases the efficiency and
effectiveness of these efforts.54 Control is key in President Xi’s state-centric
approach, and the digital renminbi provides a level of control that is
unparalleled in modern economies.

51

Kevin Yao, supra note 48.
Schuman, supra note 45.
53
Id.
54
Wei, supra note 49.
52
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2. China’s Second Rationale: Reducing the Threat of
Bitcoin and Libra
Bitcoin and the Facebook-backed Libra (now known as Diem) put
central banks across the globe on notice. While cryptocurrencies’ current
threats seem limited, the alternatives they provide to typical fiat currencies
present massive implications to how people trade, transact, and save in the
not-so-distant future. Bitcoin and Libra offer different cryptocurrency
approaches. Each of these approaches will be discussed in detail below,
followed by how China accelerated its digital renminbi project to address
lingering cryptocurrency fears and how introducing the digital renminbi
limits the appeal of cryptocurrencies in China’s domestic market.
Ever since the release of Bitcoin’s source code in 2008, it continues
to draw admirers and critics, while stoking fear in central governments.
Bitcoin’s origins are shrouded in mystery: the identity of its creator, Satoshi
Nakamato, remains unknown.55 But, despite its mysterious beginnings,
Bitcoin’s value continues to skyrocket. In the past year, the value of a single
bitcoin rose nearly 300 percent to over $35,000.56 Australian economist,
Nicholas Gruen, laid out the striking potential of Bitcoin, noting the
cryptocurrency could be a “microeconomic miracle worker and it could be a
macroeconomic wrecking ball.”57
Bitcoin emerged from a hacker counterculture driven by distrust in
the governments, banks, and institutions that control the global money
supply. The timing of Bitcoin’s release to the public in 2008, a year that saw
one of the biggest financial crashes in modern history, is no coincidence. The
value in a fiat currency, a currency backed by an underlying commodity, is
derived from trust in its issuing body. Both history and modern times provide
examples of this trust eroding and the value of a currency disappearing as a
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result. Whether it be the fall of Rome,58 or the 2008 financial crisis,59 the
erosion of the public’s trust in central governments or banking systems often
leads to financial hardship and ruin. The creator(s) of Bitcoin recognized the
growing distrust in fiat currencies and responded accordingly. They
eliminated the need for trust in any individual or company and placed it
elsewhere—in mathematical formulas and computer software.60
Bitcoin conducts its transactions using a decentralized ledger which
holds a record of every Bitcoin and entry.61 A massive network of computers,
or nodes, maintain the ledger.62 Each node, the server that verifies and
maintains the transactions across the ledger, acts as a verifier, deciphering a
complex formula that creates a consensus among the millions of other nodes
that a Bitcoin transaction is legitimate.63 The amount of Bitcoin is finite, with
the total amount—21 million—expected to be released by 2140.64 The finite
amount of currency and the consensus approach used to verify transactions
aim to create trust in the Bitcoin network versus trust in any individual or
corporation.
Bitcoin advocates tout the cryptocurrency’s ability to offer faster,
cheaper, and more secure transactions by cutting out intermediaries.65
Further, Bitcoin’s ledger is completely transparent, offering a log of every
transaction and owner of Bitcoin throughout its entire history.66 While there
is value in offering Bitcoin in already well-developed western societies,
Bitcoin’s potential also stems from its ability to serve the unbanked
populations in third-world countries.67
The sole requirement of transacting with Bitcoin is a device with
internet access.68 Citizens in third-world countries who lack access to a
traditional bank or cannot afford the exorbitant fees charged to transact
58
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internationally can use Bitcoin’s virtually-free network to trade both locally
and internationally.69 While still in its infancy, Bitcoin provides a legitimate
alternative to fiat currencies, creating fear in central banks worldwide,
including the PBOC.
The emergence of Libra struck a similar fear in central banks. Libra
provides an alternative digital currency that is corporation-backed, mainly by
Facebook. Its status as a “stablecoin” puts Libra more in line with traditional
fiat currencies. A stablecoin derives its name from its ability to maintain a
relatively stable value.70 In Libra’s case, its stability is derived from its basket
of currencies, including the U.S. dollar, the Euro, and the Japanese Yen.71 In
addition to its stability, Libra’s value-proposition is similar to Bitcoin’s: the
ability to extend financial services to the 1.7 billion unbanked across the
world and provide a cheaper and faster means of transacting money across
the globe.72
Unlike Bitcoin, Libra limits its number of nodes. Only members of
the Libra Association (such as Facebook and Uber) are allowed the access
needed to keep track of the data on the transaction ledger.73 Fewer nodes
makes scalability easier and transaction processing quicker.74
Almost immediately, Libra faced waves of criticism from
governments. According to France’s economic minister, Bruno Le Maire,
Libra is “a threat to national sovereignty.”75 Federal Reserve Chairman,
Jerome Powell, echoed similar sentiments acknowledging “serious concerns
regarding privacy, money laundering, consumer protection, and financial
stability.”76 Concerns did not stop there. Legitimate fears arose regarding a
privately led corporation, especially one directly connected to Facebook,
driving the compilation of the currency basket.77
Libra yielded to this criticism. Instead of being pegged against a
basket of currencies, the initial launch of Libra will be tied to one currency:
69
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the U.S. dollar.78 The ambitious goals of Libra are now severely constrained
as they react to pressure from regulators domestically and abroad. However,
the fear of Libra and Bitcoin led to accelerated initiatives to establish central
bank digital currencies, including the digital renminbi.
Well before China wrote the digital renminbi into its five-year plan,
the country recognized the threat that cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin posed
to the state’s sovereignty. In 2013, after seeing a surge in Bitcoin value,
China blocked all financial institutions from processing Bitcoin-related
transactions.79
Bitcoin and other decentralized currencies threaten central banks’
abilities to implement monetary policies. A shift in use from central bank
currencies to alternative currencies significantly limits the effectiveness of
inflationary of deflationary efforts. Additionally, a central aim of China’s
surveillance state is to eliminate terroristic threats, both domestically and
internationally.80 A decentralized currency transacts completely
anonymously, limiting China’s ability to track and eliminate potential
terrorist threats.
The benefits touted by China’s digital renminbi mirror those of
Bitcoin and Libra. The digital renminbi offers near-instantaneous
transactions and the ability to reach rural citizens throughout the country.81
Finally, the transactions are either low-cost or completely free, providing
significant economic incentives for vendors. By directly embracing the
attributes of a decentralized cryptocurrency, China limits the appeal of
adopting alternative cryptocurrencies. Further, China’s ability to track
transactions eases the central government’s fear of cryptocurrencies
facilitating terroristic activities.

3. China’s Third Rationale: Providing Support for the
Existing, and Widely Used, Mobile Payment
Infrastructure
The digital renminbi’s introduction gives China state-wide control
over the future of cashless transactions. Mobile apps developed by Chinabased companies, such as WeChat and AliPay, have a stranglehold over
78
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China’s mobile payment marketplace. But with the emergence of the digital
renminbi, the PBOC opens the market to state-owned banks, creating
competition and reducing the threats posed by the current private duopoly.
The emergence of mobile payment options and the digital renminbi’s future
role in this space will be discussed below.
As China’s day-to-day activities move from cash to digital payments,
WeChat Pay and AliPay reap the benefits. The two payment platforms host
over two billion users, and over 90 percent of the population in the largest
cities use digital technology as their primary payment platform.82 China’s
society was well-positioned to see this tremendous shift to digital payments.
The resistance to the introduction of card payments, and the cumbersome
nature of cash transactions, gave digital payment technology an opening to
assert its advantages.
Despite being the largest card network in the world, China faces
nationwide resistance to card-based terminals. Two factors drive this
resistance: transaction fees and implementation costs. Card-based terminals
require merchants to pay processing fees up to 100 basis points on each
transaction.83 Merchants are resistant to incur costs associated with adopting
the payment terminals, nor are they willing to pass along the costs to their
customers.84 The pushback means a slow adoption of terminals across the
country.
Additionally, cash transactions continue to be cumbersome in daily
commerce. The largest denomination of the yuan in circulation is the
equivalent of fifteen U.S. dollars.85 This low value makes large cash
transactions difficult to process. As a result, merchants use cash counting
machines to speed transaction processing and protect against the usage of
counterfeit notes.86
The struggles of card and cash transactions left the market open to
alternative options and digital payments took advantage. By creating digital
wallets that directly store the value of a currency and giving each user (both
individuals and merchants) an account, digital payment technology
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effectively eliminated intermediaries.87 Without intermediaries, transactions
become instantaneous, and merchants benefit from drastic cost reductions.88
Both WeChat and AliPay continue to evolve their digital wallet
offerings, including creating partnerships with financial institutions that
enable funds held in digital wallets to accrue interest, much like funds would
in a traditional banking account.89 The greater transparency allows digital
payment companies to issue small business loans based on a deep
understanding of a company’s cash flows.90
Digital payment benefits are nearly endless, and China refuses to let
private players be the sole beneficiaries. The introduction of the digital
renminbi brings a broader set of competitors into the marketplace, reducing
the systemic risk posed by the current duopoly. Two opportunities present
themselves to China: it could take the approach of being a direct competitor
to WeChat and AliPay and provide incentives to encourage digital renminbi
use; alternatively, the country could use the digital renminbi defensively,
ensuring a failure of one of the private players has a limited impact on the
broader economy.
WeChat and AliPay’s duopoly over the digital payment market
creates a state-wide risk of default. Whether it be the loss of consumer funds,
the inability to complete transactions, a loss of service, or worse yet, an allout default, a private-only approach poses grave risks to China’s domestic
economy. The introduction of a state-run infrastructure provides a backbone
to the digital marketplace—significantly reducing the risk of a technological
failure or default by one of the current marketplace leaders.
A major question for the digital renminbi is how its introduction will
affect the dominance of WeChat and AliPay. The digital renminbi must
provide incentives to shift consumer usage and merchant preference. One
advantage the central bank currency has is its ability to offer truly free
transactions. While WeChat and AliPay are considerably cheaper than cardbased transactions, there are still small fees associated with the transactions.91
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The PBOC’s ability to offer no-fee transactions may incentivize merchants
to offer discounts for its usage, having the long-term effect of shifting usage
to the central bank currency. 92
Alternatively, China could introduce subsidies to encourage further
adoption. In its first pilot test, China distributed half of the participants'
paychecks in travel subsidies.93 Providing limited usage subsidies as part of
broader digital renminbi rollout encourages the adoption of the new platform
and a more forceful shift from the private payment providers.
Regardless of how the PBOC chooses to introduce the digital
renminbi, a government-backed payment infrastructure provides the
marketplace stability that private players do not. Both WeChat Pay and
AliPay are supported by large worldwide corporations that are exposed to
many different business activities, and therefore many different risks. The
ability to complete transactions in some of China’s biggest cities is gravely
threatened by a business interruption. The PBOC recognizes this risk. And
the introduction of a government-backed alternative enables the PBOC to
ensure disruptions in the private players infrastructure do not have countrywide economic ramifications. Even if the digital renminbi is used solely as a
defensive play, it still greatly benefits the country.

4. China’s Fourth Rationale: Promoting Financial
Inclusion
A hallmark endeavor that accompanied President Xi’s rise to power
was an increased emphasis on alleviating poverty throughout the country. In
2015, the President announced a goal to eradicate extreme poverty. And in
early December 2020, China declared it reached its goal—a proclamation
that has come with its share of skeptics.94 Even with the achievement, antipoverty initiatives remain one of the government’s core priorities. The digital
renminbi’s place in China’s anti-poverty efforts will be discussed below.
When President Xi announced his anti-poverty campaign in 2015,
the country classified 832 counties (30 percent of the country’s total) as

92
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poverty-stricken.95 Nearly all those counties are rural.96 The nature of living
in rural China stands in stark contrast to the fast-paced, high-functioning city
centers: the internet is scarce, access to banks is minimal, and living
conditions are often inadequate.
To drive its anti-poverty initiative, China adopted two povertyreducing measures. First, the country introduced industries, such as growing
and processing mushrooms, to pool labor and stoke job growth.97 Second,
China took a more drastic approach, moving inhabitants to better-connected
areas throughout the country. The driving factor behind the mass-movement
is the exorbitant costs of providing necessary services to the remote locales.98
Even with these anti-poverty efforts, China continues to provide significant
amounts of aid to the impoverished.99
Additionally, China focused government efforts toward increasing
financial inclusion throughout the country. In 2015, China launched the Plan
for Advancing Inclusive Finance Development, a five-year endeavor to
develop a system dedicated to creating a “moderately prosperous society.”100
A key goal of the initiative is to increase financial inclusions coverage by
making banking institutions and services available in all townships across the
country.101
China’s initiatives yielded impressive results. China developed a
vast agent infrastructure, improved financial services offerings, and
increased the rate of account ownership, putting the country on par with many
other G-20 countries.102 Where there are inclusion gaps, financial technology,
such as the digital payment offerings of WeChat and AliPay, help fill the
void. Yet, despite these improvements, China’s offerings still fail to reach
many of the rural unbanked populations across the country.
Banking access continues to apply downward pressure to financial
inclusion growth. Forty-five percent of households in China note that they
95
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chose financial services based on the convenience of locations.103 When
accessibility is lacking, financial usage is low.104 However, low financial
usage frequently leads to a limited number of financial services offerings.105
The answer to accessibility seems simple: provide more banking
institutions. But rural and impoverished areas generate low profits for banks
compared to the high costs of developing rural operations. As a result, the
areas needing financial services the most are often underserved by banking
institutions.106 Traditional finance options fail to address the inclusion issue.
The emergence of an offline digital payment technology may finally
solve the accessibility problem. The digital renminbi’s most transformative
impact may be its ability to increase financial inclusion and reduce poverty
within the country. Reducing transactions costs and the ability to transact
without internet access can increase banking access across the country. Once
access is increased, service offerings such as interest-bearing digital
currency, micro-loans, and access to credit facilities, will be available, even
without online access.107
Widespread cell phone usage makes the digital renminbi a viable
alternative to traditional paper currency, but the ability to transact offline is
the true game-changer. Nearly 97 percent of China’s population either has
access or knows someone with access to a cell phone.108 However, the extent
of internet access is drastically lower.109 But the digital renminbi’s ability to
work offline should ease any concerns over internet availability. Offline
usage minimizes the impacts of internet accessibility and speeds up the
digital renminbi’s adoption.110
The digital renminbi will be the country’s most effective tool for
reducing poverty and increasing financial inclusion. Between the speed of
103

Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
105
World Bank Group [WBG] & People’s Bank of China, Toward Universal
Financial Inclusion in China: Models, Challenges, and Global Lessons, 6 (2018),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/29336/FinancialIncl
usionChinaP158554.pdf.
106
Id.
107
Charles Chang, The Paperless Potential of China’s Digital Currency, PROF.
WEALTH MGMT. (June 24, 2020), https://www.pwmnet.com/FinancialCentres/Asia/China/The-paperless-potential-of-China-s-digital-currency.
108
Toward Universal Financial Inclusion in China, supra note 105, at 14.
109
Id. Only 52 percent of the China’s adult population can access the internet.
110
See Jane Li, China’s Digital Yuan is Beginning Its Assault on the World’s
Biggest Mobile Wallets, QUARTZ (Dec. 7, 2020), https://qz.com/1942470/chinasdigital-yuan-begins-assault-on-alipay-and-wechat-pay/.
104

833

834

U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y

[Vol. XV No. 2

disbursing funds, and the ability to transact offline, historically underfunded
populations are easily within reach. The opportunity is tremendous for China
domestically, and it also provides a selling point for the adoption of the
digital currency in foreign markets.

5. China’s Fifth Rationale: Protecting Against
Money Laundering, Fraud, and Terrorism
Financing
Another fundamental goal for China’s regime is to maintain both
economic and political stability. In recent years, China imposed nationwide
crackdowns on corruption, money laundering, fraud, and terrorism activities,
in the hopes of maintaining social order amidst broader regime changes. As
China faces threats both internally and externally, the digital renminbi
provides the country another tool to protect social order.
Reducing illicit capital flows both in and out of the country is
essential to ensure economic stability in mainland China. While China’s
economy has grown to be more open in the past two decades, there are still
controls in place to monitor foreign investment, domestic outflows, and other
economic transactions.111 In 2015, China’s net errors and omissions (NEO)
was nearly negative $200 billion,112 reflecting massive amounts of money
leaving the country through unofficial channels and navigating around
China’s market controls.113
China acknowledges the shortcomings in its anti-money laundering
efforts. In May 2020, the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress, one of the central legislative bodies in the PRC, placed the
amendment of the thirteen-year-old anti-laundering law on the upcoming
legislative agenda.114 The deficiencies of the current anti-money laundering
law are obvious: punishment is lenient and narrow compared to the damage
the money laundering can inflict.115
China’s current anti-money laundering law targets primarily
financial institutions, which historically, were the primary source of money
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laundering in the country.116 Recently, however, the scale and scope of
laundering have broadened. Today, money laundering efforts flow through
real estate, precious metals, and a wide range of other non-financial
industries.117 In the proposed amendment, China hopes to adopt a risk-based
assessment requiring institutions to allocate resources to develop prevention
and control measures. Its goal: broader efforts to identify and eliminate
money laundering activities.118
Like money laundering, fraud runs rampant throughout the Chinese
economy. And oftentimes, local governments are to blame for the run-up of
fraudulent loans and other illicit activities. The central government prevents
provincial governments in China from issuing their own debt.119 To navigate
around these restrictions, local officials will set up shell companies to borrow
from banks and finance projects for the province.120 As bribery drives lending
actions, banks get burdened by large single-borrower loans that lead to little
or no return in value.121
Fraud does not stop with the local government. In 2015, the Bank of
Liuzhou discovered $4.9 billion of fraudulent loans.122 Similarly, other large
Chinese banks discovered fraudulent loans of $147 million and $578
million.123 The importance of these banks to the Chinese economy grants
them a near too-big-to-fail status. The Chinese government often prevents
the dire implications of writing down bad loans by providing stimulus or
alternative means of limiting bank defaults.124
The digital renminbi could assist in developing more effective antimoney laundering and fraud controls. First, the ledger allows both financial
and non-financial institutions to identify customers before transactions are
approved. If a customer flags as a potential risk, the institution could require
further investigation or deny the transaction altogether. The onus would be
116
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on the institution to conduct these risk-based assessments on the front-end.
But if an institution fails to do so, Chinese regulatory administrations could
impose penalties using transactional data from the digital renminbi ledger.
Additionally, the digital renminbi would enable regulatory agencies
to do broad checks across the country for illicit activities. Tracing the
movement of money through multiple intermediaries would be considerably
easier. Identifying and punishing repeat-offenders, whether it be for
laundering money, disbursing fraudulent loans, or failure to abide by the
requisite checks, would be simple and effective.

III. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
China’s digital renminbi provides significant domestic benefits, but
it also has the potential to legitimatize the renminbi in the global marketplace.
If China chooses to couple the digital currency with its Belt Road Initiative
(BRI), it could provide a legitimate alternative to traditionally dominant
western currencies.125

A. The Belt and Road Initiative
Two factors drove China’s global emergence over the past two
decades: cheap labor and a booming domestic market. This growth drove
international investors, both corporations and countries, to flock to the
mainland. But China’s clout, as an investing player of its own, grew with the
introduction of the BRI.
President Xi unveiled China’s ambitious BRI in 2013, setting the
course for a large-scale strategy of global Chinese influence.126 China’s BRI
aspires to create a modern silk road, replicating the trade route that connected
countries throughout Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe in the
fifteenth and sixteenth century.127 The aim: to expand China’s global
economic integration and jumpstart the slowing growth of its domestic
economy. 128 A broad initiative connecting these regions gives China greater
and more secure access to energy and natural resources, and enables China
to export its massive surplus of domestic goods and labor.129
125
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Despite President Xi’s goal of economic self-reliance, much of
China’s economic growth prospects are export-driven. Continuing to develop
and grow markets to be consumers of Chinese goods boosts its economy in
the short and long term. The BRI enables Chinese state-owned enterprises to
drive infrastructure improvements across Asia and abroad, improving crossborder transports, increasing bilateral trade, and engraining the Chinese
economy in neighboring countries.130 The short-term gain is simple:
increased work for state-owned enterprises. The long-term gain is more
profound; it enables China to bring developing countries into the modern
world. The BRI establishes goodwill and trade advantages for China that will
drive economic growth for the next century.
China’s ambitions do not stop with physical infrastructure
development; it aims to become the global leader in manufacturing by
2025.131 To do this, China is determined to be at the forefront of robotic and
other informational technology.132 The technology advancements are not
merely for domestic gains. Combining China’s current physical
infrastructure projects in BRI countries with its future technological
ambitions engrains Chinese technology in emerging economies worldwide.
If the BRI’s broad economic ambitions prove successful, foreign goods
developed with Chinese manufacturing equipment and technology will flow
across borders using Chinese-built infrastructure—cementing China’s grasp
of the global economy.
Maintaining economic growth domestically and abroad serves an
essential purpose for China—preserving stability within the region and
providing security for the one-party government.133 Economic stability is
nearly as important in China’s neighboring countries as well. The Chinese
government largely believes that poverty and underdeveloped economies
lead to extremism against their one-party system.134
Fostering economic development in neighboring countries achieves
two goals. First, China hopes economic development will reduce foreign
poverty levels and consequently stymie China’s “three evils.”135 Second,
130
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China seeks to bolster the strength of authoritarian governments ruling in
neighboring countries.136 China’s economic ambitions aim to fulfill an
underlying ideological goal: projecting domestic economic tranquility and
portraying itself as a strong partner for authoritarian regimes.
The BRI presents another burgeoning opportunity for China: the
development of the renminbi as a legitimate global currency. Direct
investment by the central bank and Chinese firms into emerging economies
present entryways to grow the renminbi on the world stage. In 2019, direct
investment from Chinese firms in Belt and Road Initiatives was worth $15
billion.137 The renminbi made up a quarter of the transactions.138 This direct
connection to emerging economies could be the path China takes to broaden
the renminbi’s international exposure.

B. The Asian International Infrastructure Bank: China’s
Global Banking Emergence
China paints a bleak picture of traditional western funding
mechanisms. It views institutions such as the IMF and World Bank as overly
burdened by bureaucracy and time-consuming processes.139 Even more
egregious, according to China, is that the loans themselves come hindered
with liberal democratic contingencies aimed at political reform.140 China’s
creation of an alternative global bank, the Asian International Infrastructure
Bank (AIIB), aims to counter traditional lending structures.141 The AIIB
offers infrastructure loans to emerging economies sans political influence.
The creation of the AIIB moved China into an international lending position
that typical western powers, especially the U.S., aimed to prevent.142 China’s
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ability to convince nearly one hundred other countries to join shows the
influence it holds.143
Coupling the AIIB with the BRI enables China to become the
predominant lending arm for its vast infrastructure initiative. The AIIB can
accelerate projects by providing capital and other financial services with
minimal bureaucratic hurdles. While one hundred countries have a position
in the bank, China holds nearly 26 percent of the voting shares, more than
any other member.144 This power gives China extensive control over the
direction and decision-making of the bank.
The AIIB provides an opportunity for China to become a legitimate
global lending power. The AIIB’s initial approach focused on building a
lending track record that solidifies its legitimacy.145 However, as the U.S.
backed off its international presence under the Trump Administration, an
opening presented itself for a new “soft power” player globally. The AIIB
will help achieve “diplomatic, economic and political objectives like
providing multilateral aid, nurturing new markets, developing ‘soft power’
and steering Asian regional cooperation and integration.”146 The bank placed
China on the world stage for lending—garnering a level of respect that has
eluded the country throughout its history. China hopes international respect
for the renminbi will follow.

C. A Legitimate Renminbi on the Global Stage
China’s inability to control domestic lending practices is the primary
contributor to the renminbi’s slow ascent to global legitimacy. Despite a push
to increase governance and regulation, China continues to struggle reining in
foreign investment undertaken by regional governments and state-owned
enterprises.147 The AIIB’s adherence to typical international financial
governing standards garnered respect across the international community,
but other investing throughout China has failed to adhere to these same
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standards.148 And until investments of the renminbi from abroad can be
assured to be safe and risk adverse, China faces an uphill battle. The digital
renminbi presents a ripe opportunity to counter this problem.
The value proposition of the digital renminbi on a global lending
stage is summed up through three main points. First, the digital renminbi
provides loan transparency for regional and state-owned enterprises loan
statuses. Second, the digital renminbi provides benefits further down the loan
money-stream, including additional oversight for investments. Finally, the
digital renminbi offers a streamlined loan process, avoiding the traditional
banking system that is both slow and costly.
China’s inability to regulate the lending practices of regional
government entities and state-owned enterprises hinders the renminbi’s
acceptance as a global reserve currency. The fear of mismanaged investments
or corrupt loan processes exposes the renminbi to external risks of loan
default and other impactful financial results.149 The ledger that drives China’s
digital renminbi eliminates the transparency issues facing the physical
renminbi, making the digital renminbi entirely traceable, and enabling the
central government to have oversight of virtually every transaction.150
The digital renminbi gives China even more power to ensure stateowned enterprises fall in line—an increasingly important initiative for
President Xi.151 If state-owned enterprises are funneling money into
unsuccessful projects, the central government could identify these
transactions and stop them in their tracks—projecting the validity of its loan
practices. This transparency provides further legitimization of the renminbi
as a stable currency on the global stage.
The transparency capabilities of the digital renminbi do not stop with
domestic lending institutions. Enabling BRI loans to be made with the digital
renminbi gives lenders, including the PBOC, visibility to the usage of project
funds. Specifically, lenders can ensure adherence to stipulated usages and
enforce loan contingencies. The additional oversight gained minimizes the
risk associated with projects, especially those in emerging economies with
questionable lending track records who are struggling to repay their loans
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amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.152 Gaining additional control in
investments enables lenders to reduce exposure to failed projects and remove
themselves from troublesome ventures before recognizing a complete loss.
The digital renminbi presents benefits to those receiving loans as
well. Projects funded with a digital renminbi receive the added benefit of a
streamlined currency with minimal transaction costs.153 A loan issued from
the lender is received instantaneously, enabling projects to move forward
expeditiously. The reduced transaction costs associated with a loan
disbursement would either ensure full utilization of the loan amount from the
lender or reduce the interest rate that may be inflated to account for systemic
transaction costs. The digital renminbi presents substantial cost savings
because of its streamlined processing.

D. The Digital Renminbi’s Place in the BRI
Coupling the digital renminbi with China’s BRI serves two purposes.
First, it encourages loans and transactions to be conducted via the digital
renminbi, thereby introducing more of the currency into the global
marketplace. Second, it increases digital renminbi adoption by encouraging
other non-Asian countries to adopt the currency when investing in the BRI’s
emerging economies.
Insisting upon the usage of the renminbi for BRI transactions creates
an outflow of the digital currency, enabling foreign governments and
companies to increase their renminbi utilization in other transactions. A
focused initiative in an Asian trading bloc allows China to circulate its
renminbi across various countries in southeast and central Asia.154 The
currency could be used for trade with China and other countries as well.
China’s continued investment in infrastructure and other export and import
exchanges throughout the region supports the cross-border currency flow.155
Additionally, the transparency abilities of the digital renminbi give
loan providers a sense of security. Greater transparency ensures that the
152
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money lent is being used appropriately and providers could stipulate further
funding activities based on the use and subsequent returns on their
investment. The transparency and lower transaction costs presented by the
digital renminbi minimize the risk associated with projects. While projects in
emerging economies will always pose risks, they also present immense
growth value. A digital renminbi provides transparency into these
investments, giving foreign investors peace of mind that they have ultimate
oversight of their money, and enabling them to hedge against the downside
of the loan, locking in the massive upside potential.

E. Convertibility with other Cryptocurrencies
One crucial decision for China to make regarding the digital
renminbi is its ability to be converted to other alternative cryptocurrencies.
This function is inherent in most cryptocurrencies. For example, using a
common cryptocurrency exchange such as Coinbase, a single Bitcoin can be
converted to its Ether equivalent in a rather pain-free transaction.
Whether the digital renminbi will be convertible remains to be seen.
But China’s fear of capital flight (money rapidly leaving the country) seems
to indicate the answer will likely be no. Convertibility lends a relatively easy
pathway to massive capital flight. The same capital flight that has plagued
China over the past two decades.156 Allowing the ability to convert digital
renminbi to other central government currencies, or in a more extreme action,
cryptocurrencies, would allow for streamlined capital movement outside of
China. This hardly seems like an action the PRC would allow. But if they do,
the negative implications of China’s digital renminbi, discussed above and
below, would be greatly diminished.

IV. THE DARK SIDE OF THE DIGITAL CURRENCY: THE DIGITAL
RENMINBI’S ROLE IN CHINA’S SECURITY STATE.
In China, monitoring is the norm. From tracking citizens’
movements to controlling internet usage, China has concocted a surveillance
state prevalent throughout nearly every aspect of daily life. China’s social
credit system, a way of measuring an individual’s adherence to party
ideologies, is merely one aspect of the country’s security state. This section
begins with a discussion of China’s “Three Evils,” and showcases how the
digital renminbi ties into China’s social credit system. A discussion of the
more extreme measures undertaken by the PRC follows. These inhumane
156
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measures highlight the country’s quick devolvement from mere social
tracking to radical initiatives aiming to curb supposed party dissidents,
showcasing the biggest threat of a digital renminbi.

A. The “Three Evils” – Separatism, Terrorism, and
Extremism
The digital renminbi’s role in China’s crackdown on the so-called
“Three Evils”—separatism, terrorism, and extremism—presents one of the
currency’s most intriguing and most fear-inducing benefits. As President Xi
came to power in 2013, he advocated an intense focus on forming true leaders
in the PRC. Per President Xi, a true leader must show extreme loyalty to the
“Communist Party, its leader, and its ideological roots, in good times and
bad.”157 These expectations are no different for the rest of the Chinese
population.158
In 2017, China launched a technology-driven security system across
the Xinjiang region. This system, premised upon 7,500 “convenience police
stations,” utilizes multiple means of surveillance to patrol the region,
including facial recognition, biometric data, GPS tracking, and spyware in
phones.159 Monitoring is critical, and the system identifies citizens that may
incite acts of extremism, or “hatred, discrimination, or agitating violence
through distorting religious doctrines or other means.”160
While China’s current surveillance infrastructure is extensive, gaps
exist. China has attempted to fill the surveillance voids by mobilizing the
population to create the “people’s war on terrorism.”161 By driving a culture
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of extreme loyalty to the PRC, China created a fear-inducing environment
where even neighbors report potential anti-party rhetoric or activities.162
The digital renminbi will play an integral part in China’s domestic
surveillance state and the country’s broader efforts to track and eliminate
foreign threats. While facial recognition, biometrics, GPS tracking, spyware,
and the “people’s war on terrorism” cast a wide net as part of China’s
surveillance state, holes remain. As evidenced by the previously discussed
NEO data, China's current inability to track the illicit flow of money inside
and outside the country is one of the key holes left to address.163 The digital
renminbi’s ledger can help fill this gap.
The ledger technology that provides the backbone of the digital
renminbi holds vast amounts of data that can assist in tracking transactions
both inside and outside Chinese borders. Domestic and international
organizations often gain funding through underground banks, moneylaundering, or other methods that circumvent current monetary controls.164
The ledger technology greatly reduces the effectiveness of the circumvention
efforts.
China’s digital ledger accesses every transaction conducted using the
digital renminbi, tracking the amount, recipient, and sender.165 This massive
amount of data allows detailed analysis to identify and act on any potential
threat. A digital ledger bolsters the already significant controls that the PRC
has in place. While the digital renminbi may not eliminate terroristic threats,
it provides a missing piece to China’s surveillance puzzle.

B. China’s Social Credit System
To enforce adherence to party ideology, China created an elaborate,
society-encompassing, social credit system that grades nearly every aspect of
life. From reading texts, listening to phone calls, and tracking packages, the
state is ever-present.166 If a citizen follows what the country deems to be
162
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“good behaviors,” their grade goes up. If they cross the street at the wrong
time, express doubt about party efforts, or even buy too much alcohol, their
grade goes down.167 China’s surveillance state encroaches on the civil rights
of China’s citizens and the digital renminbi could be yet another piece
furthering this encroachment.
In 2014, China introduced its social credit system, linking “personal
financial data to every part of an individual’s social life,” and creating a
collective score that enables a citizen to be eligible or ineligible for social
goods.168 From bike-sharing to quick loans, a good score gives them access
to a myriad of social goods. Meanwhile, a bad score blocks them off from
these options, potentially leading to more significant ramifications.169 Some
Chinese citizens view the social credit system as a necessary means to the
desired end, a sacrifice of individual autonomy to create a more harmonious
society where an adherence to ethical values—as established by the state—
can be measured, rewarded, and publicized accordingly.170
However, many of China’s citizens recognize the privacy
infringement the social credit system perpetuates. In a society where facial
recognition, amongst many other means of tracking, is expected in everyday
life, the social credit system is yet another encroachment on a citizen’s ability
to act without being monitored.171 The public is wary of the social credit
system because not only are a citizen’s actions considered, but the actions of
individuals they associate with are factored in as well.172 The “guilt-byassociation” model is not new for China.173 And its inclusion in the social
credit system is deliberate. If the actions of family, friends, or other
connections influence a social rating, a citizen is more likely to police their
behavior to adhere to party norms.
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Control is China’s goal. The social credit system executes that goal
to near perfection. However, when the social credit system is not enough to
dissuade anti-party behavior, China turns to more sinister, inhumane means
to achieve party alignment. Worldwide leaders cannot ignore this dark side
of China’s surveillance state when considering the emergence of the digital
renminbi.

C. From Social Credit to Genocide
Genocide: a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at
the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national
groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups
themselves.174
In early 2021, following years of public outcry, the U.S. officially
denounced China’s repression of the Uighurs and other Muslim ethnic
minorities.175 Then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, chose his words
carefully, placing emphasis on one word in particular: genocide.176 Raphael
Lemkin initially coined the term to describe the heinous acts of Nazi
Germany towards the Jewish population in World War II.177 There are two
phases to Genocide: “one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed
group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern on the oppressor.”178
The genocide of the Uighur population in the Xianjing region
harkens back to the genocide of the Jewish population by Nazi Germany,
albeit with an added technological twist. China’s surveillance state
perpetuates fear within Xianjing. Its imposition of control over every aspect
of life presents an extreme variation of China’s social credit system, a system
that grows even stronger with yet another addition to its surveillance
arsenal—a digital renminbi.
When China’s social credit system does not work, the PRC does not
hesitate to enact more extreme measures to ensure adherence to party ideas.
In a country where citizens are subservient to the state, China takes any action
to ensure conformity. Even though China’s actions in Xinjiang blatantly
174
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violate various international treaties, and even its own constitution, the PRC
shows no signs of curtailing its measures.179
China’s Constitution protects religious practice in the country.
Article 36 states: “no state organ, public organization, or individual may
compel citizens to believe in, or not believe in, any religion.”180 But at the
same time, the Constitution provides a broad exception, noting Article 36
only protects “normal” religious activities that do not “disrupt public order,
impair the health of citizens, or interfere with the educational system of the
state.”181 The “normal” activities clause gives China an avenue to persecute
those with certain religious beliefs. China is also a signatory on multiple
international treaties that explicitly ban religious persecution.182 Yet, despite
being a party to treaties that uphold religious freedom, China did not hesitate
to develop reeducation camps aimed solely at eradicating religion from the
Muslim Uighur population.
The tension with the Uighur population stems from Mao-era China,
where the PRC led a mass migration of Han Chinese into the Xianjing
region.183 The Uighurs are a primarily Muslim population who inhabited the
China’s northwest region (including Xianjing) for centuries. The forced
integration of the Han Chinese into the Uighur society led to riots and Uighur
attacks on both citizens and police, actions attributed to part of a separatist
movement in the region.184
Following multiple terrorist attacks across the Xinjiang province
(Urumqi in 2009, Beijing in 2013, and Kunming and Urumqi in 2014), China
enacted extreme security measures to secure the region.185 The “Strike Hard
Campaign against Violent Terrorism” created a quasi-police state in Xinjiang
and ushered in China’s ever-evolving surveillance society.186 But separatist
activity is not limited to the China mainland. In 2016, the Chinese blamed
179
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Uighur-led militants for a suicide bomber that attacked a Chinese Embassy
in Kyrgyzstan.187 Whether the Uighur militants truly committed the attack is
unknown, but the international threat rattled China and exposed weaknesses
in its terrorism efforts.
First put in place in 2014, the Xinjiang reeducation camps are
explicitly aimed at Uighur’s. By 2017, the Chinese government forced over
one million Uighur’s into the camps, regardless of their political beliefs or
extremism potential.188 There is one goal in China’s reeducation camps:
developing party loyalty. To emphasize the importance of this loyalty,
“Forget not the Party’s mercy, walk with the Party forever” is emblazoned
on building walls throughout the camps.189
China aims to eliminate any sense of Uighur individuality and
assimilate the Uighur population to Chinese ideals, seeking to “break their
lineage, break their roots, break their connections, and break their origins.”190
In the words of Lemkin, China seeks to destroy the national identity of the
Uighur population. China shows little restraint in achieving this aim. Forced
sterilization, restrictions on traditional religious ceremonies, and placing
approved Chinese supporters into homes, are frequently utilized in the
Xinjiang province.191
Further, China developed an artificial intelligence algorithm that
seeks to identify problematic Uighurs.192 Xinjiang’s surveillance state goes
well beyond China’s social credit system. Closed-circuit cameras with facial
recognition, spyware installed on citizens phones, “Wi-Fi sniffers” that
collect internet data, and tracking of package deliveries, are all part of
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China’s surveillance arsenal.193 The data collected from each of these
surveillance tools are fed through China’s artificial intelligence algorithm to
identify and detain “suspicious persons.”194 Two particular traits hold
extreme weight as part of the suspicion algorithm: Muslim beliefs and Uighur
nationality.195 China’s inhumane treatment of the Uighur is deplorable, and
surveillance plays a key part, if not the most important role, in the treatment.
The digital renminbi will add yet another layer to the algorithm and China’s
surveillance abilities.
The fear of internal and external dissidents led to China adopting
these inhumane measures. And despite all the benefits of the digital renminbi,
its implementation cannot be dissociated from China’s desire to increase its
ability to monitor every aspect of society. The ledger technology and its
direct integration into China’s central bank provides the country unparalleled
access to everyday life. The potential usage of the digital renminbi abroad
presents even further threats, as this same tracking could find itself prevalent
outside mainland China.
China’s failure to adhere to the religious freedom articles of
international treaties is the biggest red flag for digital renminbi proliferation.
Even if countries enact regulations limiting the human rights and autonomy
encroaching aspects of the digital renminbi, would China follow those
guidelines? China’s track record of placing the party above all else—
including its international obligations—seems to say no. A blatant disregard
of China’s international duties should provoke fear in the idea of a globally
dominant digital renminbi.

V. CONCLUSION
The technological framework of China’s digital renminbi is a digital
currency gamechanger. There are many aspects of the currency, and the
framework backing it, that should be adopted by countries seeking to
implement a digital currency of their own. These include instantaneous
payment, the ability to transact offline, easier distribution of stimulus funds
on an individual level, and reduced payment fees for even the smallest of
transactions. However, efforts must be put in place to separate these benefits
from the negative implications of China’s approach.
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First, China cannot have the ability to monitor ledger information of
international transactions. While beneficial in an authoritarian society, this
attribute implicates wide-ranging security concerns for all countries
transacting using China's framework. Second, the digital currencies use in a
surveillance-oriented state should also be limited. Though authoritarian
governments view surveillance as a positive, if not a necessity, surveillance
brings broad legal and human rights implications for democratic countries.
Adopting a digital currency but not protecting inherent individual freedom
could backfire significantly. If the public loses trust in a digital currency,
there may be a seismic shift towards alternative options, such as Bitcoin or
other non-central bank digital currencies.
Using a currency to track the movements and habits of everyday life
cuts at the core of civil rights. According to China, however, the digital
renminbi’s use as more than a medium of exchange merely follows a path set
forth by western economies.196 China contends that whether it is imposing
sanctions, or requiring the imposition of human rights standards, access to a
western economy’s currency does not just bring a new avenue of trade, but
also brings requirements to upend societies pasts—whether right or wrong.197
The digital renminbi, in China’s view, is no different. In China, the party
comes first; and a digital renminbi provides yet another tool to ensure that
citizens’ activities do not usurp party goals.
China’s ideology should strike fear in countries that will be
transacting with the digital renminbi. As with most technologies developed
in the digital age, the massive benefits come with broad privacy implications.
A digital currency, regardless of what country develops the framework,
brings with it a heightened level of data capture that could give governments
incredible amounts of user information. China exploits this information.
Democratic countries should not. The legal and ethical implications are vast
and should remain on the forefront of any digital framework to ensure that as
currency enters the digital age, privacy, and civil rights do not fall by the
wayside.
Strict enforcement and repercussions must be asserted on China as
the digital renminbi gains a foothold abroad. The current global political
climate, however, presents a headwind for consensus among countries. As
nationalism grows across the U.S., Europe, and other continents, a view of
“going it alone” continues to gain favor. But to truly protect individual rights
196
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and prevent the encroachment of a digital renminbi (or a local variation) on
everyday life, countries must band together and present a united front. As
digital currencies become the norm, individual freedom and autonomy must
become the top priority. If they are not, variations of China’s surveillance
state could proliferate across the globe.
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